Writing experts' knowledge into computers (1975–1990)
What if we wrote the rules inside an expert's head as rules, so that a computer could think like an expert? In the 1980s this idea was put to work in factories and subways, and in Japan it was called a “boom”. Open the sources, and behind it you always find the work of collecting rules and keeping them fixed.
011965–1977 · The power of knowledge
The Power Is in the Knowledge
Does a clever computer need good ways of thinking, or a huge amount of knowledge?
In 1965, Edward Feigenbaum and his colleagues, who had moved to Stanford University, built the experience of chemists reading mass-spectrometry data into DENDRAL, a program that lists every possible molecular structure. They wrote it as rules, and the candidates were narrowed down. In an example from Nilsson (2010), 14,715,813 structures were cut to about 1,284,792 by the rules about the data, and to just one when another measurement was added.
The figure on the right lines up 6 parts of 3 kinds in 729 possible ways and narrows them by adding rules. The more knowledge is added, the more the number of things to check shrinks, by orders of magnitude.
In a 1970 paper the three authors wrote: In 1977, Feigenbaum called the work of moving experts' knowledge into computers knowledge engineering, and summed it up as .
Nleft ≈ N × r₁ × r₂ × … × rk
N
number of all candidates
ri
fraction that remains after rule i (≈ is a rough guide when the rules do not affect each other)
What you think you knowThe popular story:A government white paper (2016) says (translated) The original source says:the one that turned experts' experience into rules was DENDRAL (from 1965), which came first, and in the title of a 1993 paper a person involved calls DENDRAL . The answer changes depending on where you start counting expert systems.
Sources & confidence (2)The Power Is in the Knowledge
1965Verified in the originalSources disagree
DENDRAL, a program with chemical expertise — from general cleverness toward specialist knowledge
Joshua Lederberg, a Stanford University geneticist (a Nobel laureate), had been building DENDRAL, a procedure that uses a tree structure to enumerate the molecular structures possible for a given chemical formula (a 1964 NASA report). Edward Feigenbaum and colleagues, who moved from the University of California, Berkeley to Stanford in 1965, added to it the experience-based knowledge chemists use when reading mass spectrometry data (a method that breaks molecules apart and measures the weights of the fragments). They built that knowledge in as rules of the form , creating Heuristic DENDRAL, which narrows down the candidates. For one compound, more than 14.71 million candidates were reduced to about 1.28 million by the mass spectrometry data, and to one when other measurements were added (Nilsson). In their 1970 paper the three separated the breadth of problems that can be handled (generality), the quality of the answers, and whether they can be produced at a reasonable cost (specialization). They wrote and chose the path of valuing knowledge of a specific field. This idea led to the expert systems of the 1980s (AI with built-in specialist knowledge).
The popular story:Even Japan's white paper says (translated) The original source says:a program that builds in rules based on experts' experience came earlier, with Heuristic DENDRAL, which began in 1965. The developers themselves call DENDRAL in the title of their 1993 paper. In 1970 the idea of specialist knowledge over general cleverness had also been written down. The central idea of the second boom (the 1980s) was born in the middle of the first boom.
5 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:“The first expert system”: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications' FY2016 White Paper on Information and Communications describes MYCIN (1972) as and “said to be the world's first”. The DENDRAL developers, on the other hand, call DENDRAL in the title of their 1993 paper. It depends on where you start counting expert systems.
In his invited paper at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-77), held at MIT in the United States in August 1977, Edward Feigenbaum of Stanford University called the work of transferring experts' knowledge into computers and explained its art through examples from his own research. He argued that the power of intelligent behavior comes from experts' knowledge rather than from general reasoning methods, and summed it up as “in the knowledge is the power.” He also gave a second reason why META-DENDRAL, a program that discovers rules automatically, came to exist: in building intelligent application programs, he had realized that (a bottleneck is the narrowest part of a path, the hard spot). META-DENDRAL finds rules from measurement data of molecules whose structures are known, and he said it produced rules at a level comparable to those made by experts.
The popular story:It is often said that second-boom AI could only be filled with experts' knowledge written in by hand, and that learning from data began with the third boom (this site's split between the second and third booms follows that form too) The original source says:The 1977 paper that wrote itself introduces, as one solution, META-DENDRAL, a program that finds rules automatically from measurement data (it says a paper on the rules it found was published in a major chemistry journal). The first example in the same paper was PUFF, a diagnosis program for lung-function tests (55 rules), which could be built with fewer than 50 hours of interaction with an expert and under 10 person-weeks of effort, a story of small effort.
What we still don’t know:The paper is described as , and it announces that the second will discuss the general troubles of knowledge engineering (how to find experts, the shortage of people, research funding, and so on). This site has not confirmed whether the second paper was published.
What the figure shows:Chapter 4's DENDRAL generated all candidates and removed those that did not fit its knowledge; this chapter changes the viewpoint, keeping the same elimination procedure but showing that adding expert knowledge as if–then cards, 1 at a time, reduces the remaining candidates by multiplication until far fewer remain. Intelligence therefore comes from plentiful knowledge more than clever reasoning methods, as in the 1970 paper and the 1977 statement “in the knowledge is the power.”
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_knowledge_prune.py
021972–1978 · MYCIN
Confidence Factors for
How do you connect rules that contain a ?
From about 1972, Edward Shortliffe and his colleagues at Stanford University built MYCIN, a program that advises doctors on choosing drugs for bacterial infections. They wrote doctors' knowledge as rules of the form: if (the lab result is ...) then (the germ is probably ...). The rules numbered about 200 at first and about 500 by 1978.
Each rule carries a confidence factor (from −1 to +1) that says how sure it is. When a condition is uncertain, multiply the rule's confidence factor by how certain the condition is. In an example from the developers' book, a rule with confidence factor 0.7 whose condition is 0.6 certain gives 0.42. When other rules support the same conclusion, they are added together with the formula below.
In the figure on the right (a bicycle example, not a medical one), adding weak rules pushes the confidence toward 1, however weak they are. The book says it chose this way of adding by intuition, not by probability theory. A textbook cited by Nilsson (2010) says that as the rules grew in number, the confidence factors of other rules also had to be corrected.
combined confidence = x + y(1 − x)
x
confidence so far
y
confidence given by the new rule (the rule's confidence × how certain its condition is; with two or more conditions, the lowest certainty)
Sources & confidence (1)Confidence Factors for
1972–1984Verified in the originalSources disagree
MYCIN: an AI of rules that advises doctors on choosing drugs for infections. Its evaluation matched specialists, yet it was not used routinely in hospitals
At Stanford University, Edward Shortliffe, then a medical student, and his colleagues developed MYCIN, a program that advises doctors on choosing drugs for bacterial infections (blood infections, and later meningitis). They built doctors' knowledge into it as rules of the form “if (a test result is ...) then (the germ is probably ...)” (about 200 at first, about 500 by 1978), and made it able to explain the reasons for its judgments. In a 1979 evaluation, for 10 meningitis patients, 8 infectious disease specialists from outside Stanford scored the prescriptions of MYCIN and of doctors without knowing whose they were. 65% of MYCIN's prescriptions were , while five Stanford specialists scored 42.5 to 62.5% (average 55.5%). Even so, the developers' book records that .
The popular story:People often say “MYCIN was more accurate than specialists but was not used in hospitals because of legal and liability problems” (Wikipedia also writes that ) The original source says:the reasons given in the developers' book (1984) are different. The program needed more knowledge about other infections, the experts left the university, funding to add knowledge was hard to get, the developers noticed weaknesses in the system and wanted to move on to the next research, and above all they knew that it would probably not be accepted, for ordinary reasons: decision-making performance (the book goes on to say that many of these were problems of ease of use and effort).
What we still don’t know:We have not checked who first brought up the matter of law and liability, or when.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Differences in the evaluation figures: Nilsson cites 70% and 75% (better than the level of agreement among the Stanford faculty). The 1979 paper itself gives 65% for the share accepted (the 5 faculty: 42.5–62.5%) and 70% for the share approved by a majority of experts (the 5 faculty: 30–50%). Chapter 30 of the same book writes that in the earlier evaluations (studies 1 and 2) about 75% were approved by a majority. The numbers change depending on which evaluation and which way of counting.
What the figure shows:Rules carry certainty factors that are weakened by multiplication when their conditions are uncertain. Combining rules supporting the same conclusion brings certainty closer to 1 even if each rule is weak, using a combination method chosen intuitively.
Number of rules used, and the combined confidence
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u06_expert_rules.py
031970s · Inference engines
Forward and Backward
When there are many rules, which rule does the machine use first?
A program that is given experts' knowledge as rules and produces answers along with the reasons is called an expert system. The part that chains the rules together to reach an answer is the inference engine. The book by the people who made MYCIN (1984) divided the ways of chaining into two. Forward (from the data) starts from the known facts and links the rules from the “if” to the “then”. Backward (from the goal) starts from the goal to be checked, traces back, and asks only for the facts that are missing. MYCIN mostly worked backward, and was also described as a program that gathers evidence.
Compare the two in the figure on the right (a bicycle example). Forward asks every question and then uses the rules, while backward asks only the questions related to the goal.
In MYCIN the collection of rules (the knowledge base) and the inference engine were separate, so an empty shell with the medical rules removed, EMYCIN (E is for empty), was built, and used for consultation systems such as tax planning.
go from the “if” (condition) to the “then” (conclusion)
Backward
trace back from the “then” to the “if”, and ask only about what is missing
Sources & confidence (1)Forward and Backward
1972–1984Verified in the originalSources disagree
MYCIN: an AI of rules that advises doctors on choosing drugs for infections. Its evaluation matched specialists, yet it was not used routinely in hospitals
At Stanford University, Edward Shortliffe, then a medical student, and his colleagues developed MYCIN, a program that advises doctors on choosing drugs for bacterial infections (blood infections, and later meningitis). They built doctors' knowledge into it as rules of the form “if (a test result is ...) then (the germ is probably ...)” (about 200 at first, about 500 by 1978), and made it able to explain the reasons for its judgments. In a 1979 evaluation, for 10 meningitis patients, 8 infectious disease specialists from outside Stanford scored the prescriptions of MYCIN and of doctors without knowing whose they were. 65% of MYCIN's prescriptions were , while five Stanford specialists scored 42.5 to 62.5% (average 55.5%). Even so, the developers' book records that .
The popular story:People often say “MYCIN was more accurate than specialists but was not used in hospitals because of legal and liability problems” (Wikipedia also writes that ) The original source says:the reasons given in the developers' book (1984) are different. The program needed more knowledge about other infections, the experts left the university, funding to add knowledge was hard to get, the developers noticed weaknesses in the system and wanted to move on to the next research, and above all they knew that it would probably not be accepted, for ordinary reasons: decision-making performance (the book goes on to say that many of these were problems of ease of use and effort).
What we still don’t know:We have not checked who first brought up the matter of law and liability, or when.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Differences in the evaluation figures: Nilsson cites 70% and 75% (better than the level of agreement among the Stanford faculty). The 1979 paper itself gives 65% for the share accepted (the 5 faculty: 42.5–62.5%) and 70% for the share approved by a majority of experts (the 5 faculty: 30–50%). Chapter 30 of the same book writes that in the earlier evaluations (studies 1 and 2) about 75% were approved by a majority. The numbers change depending on which evaluation and which way of counting.
What the figure shows:Forward reasoning asks for all known facts before connecting rules, while backward reasoning starts from the goal and asks only for missing facts. Backward reasoning asks far fewer questions.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_forward_backward.py
041970s · Explanation
A Machine You Can Ask “Why?”
How can people come to trust the answer a machine gives?
MYCIN's developers made explaining its reasons an important goal from the start. When MYCIN asked a question, the user could type WHY (why are you asking?). MYCIN then showed the higher goal it was checking and the rule that connects that goal to the question. Repeating WHY climbed higher still. Typing HOW (how did you find that out?) showed the rule it had used, or that the user had given that answer.
The figure on the right is a bicycle consultation. Answer the questions and press "Why?" a few times. In the figure, the chain of rules being checked appears.
In backward reasoning, every question comes up to check the condition of some rule. That is why the reason can be answered with a chain of rules.
Why? → higher goal + rule How? → rule / answer
Goal
the conclusion being checked right now
Chain
the links of rules from the goal down to the question
Chapter 18 of the book has an example of a WHY and HOW exchange. It is a medical example, so the figure uses a bicycle instead.
Sources & confidence (1)A Machine You Can Ask “Why?”
1972–1984Verified in the originalSources disagree
MYCIN: an AI of rules that advises doctors on choosing drugs for infections. Its evaluation matched specialists, yet it was not used routinely in hospitals
At Stanford University, Edward Shortliffe, then a medical student, and his colleagues developed MYCIN, a program that advises doctors on choosing drugs for bacterial infections (blood infections, and later meningitis). They built doctors' knowledge into it as rules of the form “if (a test result is ...) then (the germ is probably ...)” (about 200 at first, about 500 by 1978), and made it able to explain the reasons for its judgments. In a 1979 evaluation, for 10 meningitis patients, 8 infectious disease specialists from outside Stanford scored the prescriptions of MYCIN and of doctors without knowing whose they were. 65% of MYCIN's prescriptions were , while five Stanford specialists scored 42.5 to 62.5% (average 55.5%). Even so, the developers' book records that .
The popular story:People often say “MYCIN was more accurate than specialists but was not used in hospitals because of legal and liability problems” (Wikipedia also writes that ) The original source says:the reasons given in the developers' book (1984) are different. The program needed more knowledge about other infections, the experts left the university, funding to add knowledge was hard to get, the developers noticed weaknesses in the system and wanted to move on to the next research, and above all they knew that it would probably not be accepted, for ordinary reasons: decision-making performance (the book goes on to say that many of these were problems of ease of use and effort).
What we still don’t know:We have not checked who first brought up the matter of law and liability, or when.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Differences in the evaluation figures: Nilsson cites 70% and 75% (better than the level of agreement among the Stanford faculty). The 1979 paper itself gives 65% for the share accepted (the 5 faculty: 42.5–62.5%) and 70% for the share approved by a majority of experts (the 5 faculty: 30–50%). Chapter 30 of the same book writes that in the earlier evaluations (studies 1 and 2) about 75% were approved by a majority. The numbers change depending on which evaluation and which way of counting.
What the figure shows:In a machine that follows rules backward, every question checks a condition in a rule. It can therefore answer “Why are you asking?” by showing the chain of rules.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_why_how.py
051974 · Frames
Knowledge as Templates of Situations
Why does hearing just “birthday party” make you think of cake and presents?
In June 1974, Marvin Minsky of MIT put forward, in his report , the idea that when people meet a new situation, they pull a structure called a frame out of memory and adjust its details to fit reality. A frame is , and it has empty slots. The slots are temporarily filled with the values that are usually true (default values). The report gave the example of going to a child's birthday party.
In the figure on the right, have it read the story one sentence at a time. The values that are written fill the slots, and for what is not written it assumes the default values, with a . If a value differs from the default, it turns purple.
Minsky noted that he wrote it , and in the last section he wrote: . He did not build a frame system himself; students built them a few years later (Nilsson 2010).
What you think you knowThe popular story:“Second-boom AI means writing lots of knowledge as ‘if ... then ...’ rules or logical formulas” is how it tends to be lumped together The original source says:frames, one of the leading ideas of the same period, tried to represent knowledge as templates that hold expectations of how things usually are.
Sources & confidence (1)Knowledge as Templates of Situations
June 1974–1975Verified in the original
Minsky's , 1974–75 — the idea of holding knowledge as templates for common situations. On logic-based methods he himself wrote that he would
Marvin Minsky of MIT proposed a new idea in his June 1974 report . When people meet a new situation, he said, they pull out from memory a structure called a “frame” and adjust its details to fit reality. A frame is , such as being in a living room or going to a child's birthday party. In its upper part it holds knowledge that is always true. In its lower part it has (blank spaces) for specific content, and these are filled with values, which are standard expectations. Information is attached about what is likely to happen next and what to do when an expectation turns out wrong. He noted that he was writing it , and that it raises more questions than answers. Then, in the last section, , he wrote that he doubts whether ordinary knowledge can be represented effectively as many small, independently ‘true’ propositions.
The popular story:It tends to be lumped together that “second-boom AI was about writing in a lot of knowledge as ‘if ... then ...’ rules or logical formulas” (the way it is said is this site's guess) The original source says:Minsky himself, who proposed one of the key ideas of the same period, the “frame,” wrote that he doubts whether ordinary knowledge can be represented as many small, independently ‘true’ propositions. He tried instead to represent knowledge with templates that carry standard expectations (defaults). Also, according to Nilsson, Minsky himself did not build a frame system; it was built a few years later by his students
What we still don’t know:It has not been confirmed how well the idea of frames, that people think in templates of situations, matches how the actual mind works. The paper itself notes that it was written “pretending to have a unified, coherent theory.”
What the figure shows:A frame is “a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation”: a template for a common scene, with blanks provisionally filled with usual values. Reading a story fills in what is stated, uses default values to make tentative guesses about unstated parts, and allows differences to be noticed.
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u06_frames.py
061979 · How MYCIN scored
Scoring with the Names Hidden
How can we fairly check whether a machine's answer is good?
In an evaluation in 1979, 10 prescriptions were collected for each of 10 meningitis patients: from MYCIN, from five Stanford infectious-disease faculty, from an infectious-disease fellow, from an internal-medicine resident, from a medical student, and the treatment actually given. Eight infectious-disease specialists from outside Stanford scored them one by one without being able to tell whose prescription it was (8 raters × 100 = 800 ratings).
65% of MYCIN's prescriptions were , against 42.5–62.5% (average 55.5%) for the five faculty. In the cases where most of the specialists accepted the prescription, MYCIN had 7 out of 10. In the figure on the right, switch the standard and reveal the names.
Even so, the book by its builders (1984) says . They had also wanted over 90% approval from most of the specialists before routine use.
What you think you knowThe popular story:“MYCIN was more accurate than specialists, but it was not used in hospitals because of legal and liability problems” is what people tend to say The original source says:the reasons given in the builders' book are the cost and staffing of adding knowledge, the wish to move on to the next research, and above all, in their words, performance, for ordinary reasons. Most of these were problems of usability and effort.
Sources & confidence (1)Scoring with the Names Hidden
1972–1984Verified in the originalSources disagree
MYCIN: an AI of rules that advises doctors on choosing drugs for infections. Its evaluation matched specialists, yet it was not used routinely in hospitals
At Stanford University, Edward Shortliffe, then a medical student, and his colleagues developed MYCIN, a program that advises doctors on choosing drugs for bacterial infections (blood infections, and later meningitis). They built doctors' knowledge into it as rules of the form “if (a test result is ...) then (the germ is probably ...)” (about 200 at first, about 500 by 1978), and made it able to explain the reasons for its judgments. In a 1979 evaluation, for 10 meningitis patients, 8 infectious disease specialists from outside Stanford scored the prescriptions of MYCIN and of doctors without knowing whose they were. 65% of MYCIN's prescriptions were , while five Stanford specialists scored 42.5 to 62.5% (average 55.5%). Even so, the developers' book records that .
The popular story:People often say “MYCIN was more accurate than specialists but was not used in hospitals because of legal and liability problems” (Wikipedia also writes that ) The original source says:the reasons given in the developers' book (1984) are different. The program needed more knowledge about other infections, the experts left the university, funding to add knowledge was hard to get, the developers noticed weaknesses in the system and wanted to move on to the next research, and above all they knew that it would probably not be accepted, for ordinary reasons: decision-making performance (the book goes on to say that many of these were problems of ease of use and effort).
What we still don’t know:We have not checked who first brought up the matter of law and liability, or when.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Differences in the evaluation figures: Nilsson cites 70% and 75% (better than the level of agreement among the Stanford faculty). The 1979 paper itself gives 65% for the share accepted (the 5 faculty: 42.5–62.5%) and 70% for the share approved by a majority of experts (the 5 faculty: 30–50%). Chapter 30 of the same book writes that in the earlier evaluations (studies 1 and 2) about 75% were approved by a majority. The numbers change depending on which evaluation and which way of counting.
What the figure shows:When prescriptions were rated without revealing who wrote them, MYCIN's prescriptions were judged as good as, or better than, those of medical teachers. Even so, it was not used in routine clinical care.
071979–1982 · PROSPECTOR
Weighing the Odds with Multipliers
How can you estimate an ore deposit underground from clues on the surface?
SRI's PROSPECTOR was an AI that advised geologists searching for minerals, and an analysis of how well it performed was presented at the international conference in Tokyo in 1979. Its rules linked together into an inference network: a rock with crystal-shaped cavities is a sign of sulfides, and barite above sulfides may mean a massive sulfide deposit, and so on.
Unlike MYCIN's confidence factors, PROSPECTOR used probability and Bayes' rule. For each rule the expert gives two numbers: how many times the odds multiply when the condition is true (LS), and how many times when it is not (LN). In the figure on the right, pressing a clue sends the change through the network and the probability changes (the multipliers are numbers made up for this site).
In 1982, from map data for Mount Tolman (Washington State), it drew a map of how promising the area was for molybdenum deposits, on a scale from +5 to −5.
odds ← odds × LS (yes) or × LN (no) probability = odds ÷ (1 + odds)
odds
chance it happens ÷ chance it does not
LS, LN
two multipliers decided by the expert
What you think you knowThe popular story:“PROSPECTOR found an ore deposit that humans had not found” is what people tend to say The original source says:by the developers' account, it was at a place where a mining company had already found the deposit by drilling more than 200 holes, and it picked out and . And . This is confirmed only through the book of one of the developers.
Sources & confidence (2)Weighing the Odds with Multipliers
3 September 1982–1985Weakly confirmed
The story that AI's PROSPECTOR found an ore deposit ── it hit on the unknown part in a place with many clues. It did not pay
PROSPECTOR, developed at SRI, is an AI that advises experts searching for minerals, using rules of the form: if A, then B seems likely. It is known to have pinpointed, from map data, the location of a molybdenum deposit at Mount Tolman in the state of Washington. Nilsson, one of the developers, writes that it did not find a deposit in a new place. It was a place where a mining company had already drilled more than 200 holes and found the deposit, and in the digging that followed, what PROSPECTOR had predicted, and , turned out to be right. But because of the slump in mining it did not pay, and the developers wrote that .
The popular story:It is often said that PROSPECTOR discovered a deposit that humans had failed to find The original source says:According to the developers, in a place where a company had already drilled more than 200 holes and found the deposit, it correctly predicted the extent of the part that had been unknown. But it did not pay, and its success was .
What we still don’t know:The 1982 paper in Science and the 1985 letter to the journal Artificial Intelligence themselves have not been opened (only Nilsson's citations).
The AI world's big conference, the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), is held in Asia for the first time, in Tokyo
The sixth IJCAI, the international AI conference held every two years, took place in Tokyo on August 20–23, 1979. The previous five were held in Washington, London, Stanford, Tbilisi, and Cambridge, so this was the first in Asia. Kokichi Tanaka of Osaka University served as General Co-Chairman, and Saburo Tsuji of the same university served as Program Co-Chairman (for Asia) (names as romanized in the proceedings). The presentations included AI that builds in experts' knowledge (such as PROSPECTOR, which searches for minerals), and a panel discussion on Inexact Reasoning (four speakers: R. Davis, S. Kaihara, E. Shortliffe, and L. Zadeh).
What we still don’t know:We have not confirmed which venue in Tokyo it was held at, or how many people took part.
What the figure shows:PROSPECTOR estimated the chance of a mineral deposit by multiplying the odds by expert-chosen factors, LS for a yes clue and LN for a no clue. The probability rises and falls as the network of rules is followed.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_prospector_odds.py
081980 · R1 (XCON)
Noticing the Missing Parts
What kind of rules turn a computer order into an assembly diagram?
John McDermott of Carnegie Mellon University built R1 (called XCON inside the company), which decides the configuration of parts from orders for DEC's VAX computers. One machine normally has about 90 parts, and orders often left out parts that were needed. R1 noticed this, filled the gaps, and drew up the layout. From January 1980 it was used in everyday work at DEC's factory.
R1 looked at its working notes, found all the rules whose conditions fit, ran one of them, and repeated this. In the 1980 paper it had 772 rules. One order took 1,056 rule runs on average, and the computing time averaged 2.5 minutes. In the figure on the right (the parts and rules are an example made up for this site), press "Run once".
① Find every rule whose conditions are met → ② Pick one → ③ Run it and rewrite the notes → ①
Working notes
the current task (checking, placing, connecting) and the information known so far
Results of the check
In October–November 1979, six experts examined R1's output on 50 orders and found 12 places with wrong knowledge. After the rules were corrected, all 50 orders were put together correctly.
R1's rules were written so that the conditions alone decide the next correct step, and it built almost without backing up. Work on it began in December 1978.
Sources & confidence (1)Noticing the Missing Parts
January 1980–1989Verified in the originalSources disagree
R1 (XCON): an AI of “IF–THEN rules” that decides the combination of parts for computer orders, used every day at DEC's factory
John McDermott of Carnegie Mellon University developed R1 (called XCON inside the company), an AI of “IF–THEN rules” that takes orders for the computer company DEC's VAX computers and checks for shortages and combinations of the parts needed (about 90 parts per machine). Development began in December 1978; in October–November 1979 six experts checked it on 50 orders; and from January 1980 it was used routinely at DEC's factory. The number of rules grew from 772 in June 1980 to 2,500 in 1984, and adding knowledge needed about 4 people's worth of work every year. A DEC staff member wrote that maintenance work after development was where , and that specially trained people are essential.
The popular story:XCON is often called a great success that saved $40 million a year The original source says:That amount is an figure from a 1989 paper by DEC staff, and this site has confirmed it only through Nilsson's citation (the original paper could not be opened). An article written by DEC staff in 1984 gives no dollar figure; it says that continuing to add knowledge takes about 4 people's worth of effort every year, and that maintenance work “It probably represents the largest cost.” The number of rules grew from 750 to 2,500 (1984), and to 17,500 (1989) counting related systems.
What we still don’t know:How the estimate of was calculated (what was counted as a benefit) is not known, because the original paper could not be opened.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Number of rules: 772 in June 1980 (McDermott 1980), about 750 at hand-over in 1980 (Polit), 750 in October 1979 (Bachant & McDermott). The differences come from the time point and the way of counting.
What the figure shows:R1 repeatedly reads working notes, finds rules whose conditions are met, executes 1, and updates the notes. In doing so, it notices and supplies components missing from an order.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_configurator.py
091981 · Japan
Translating by Example Sentences
Can we translate without writing out all the rules of grammar?
Makoto Nagao of Kyoto University wrote that earlier machine translation had a contradiction: of its translation ability. So he proposed a system that, like a person learning a foreign language, holds many pairs of example sentences in English and Japanese. It looks for the example sentence most similar to the sentence to be translated, and swaps in words to translate it. This idea was written in a manuscript for a NATO conference in October 1981. That conference was held the week after the international Fifth Generation conference in Tokyo (October 19–22).
In the manuscript's example, from the example sentence A man eats vegetables. (人は野菜をたべる。), He eats potatoes. is translated as (彼はじゃがいもをたべる。). That works because man and he, and vegetable and potato, are close in the thesaurus. Acid eats metal. is not close to this example, so a different example is needed (酸は金属を侵す。). Try it in the figure on the right.
The opening essay of a 2015 society journal says that from this (translated), research grew into translation that uses huge amounts of text data and statistics.
What you think you knowThe popular story:“Makoto Nagao's 1984 paper started machine translation from examples” is what people say The original source says:the idea was already written in the October 1981 conference manuscript. It appeared in print in 1984.
Sources & confidence (1)Translating by Example Sentences
October 1981–1984Verified in the originalSources disagreeJapan
Makoto Nagao's concept of machine translation that finds similarities among many example sentences and translates by them (manuscript of October 1981; book in 1984)
Makoto Nagao of Kyoto University pointed out a contradiction in machine translation up to then: of its translation ability. He then proposed a mechanism like the way people learn a foreign language: give the machine a large number of paired example sentences in English and Japanese, and let it translate by finding the similarities and differences among the examples. The manuscript was written for presentation at the October 1981 NATO conference, the , at about the same time as the Fifth Generation international conference in Tokyo (October 19–22, 1981). A text written in 2015 in the journal of the natural language processing society says that from this (translated), the importance of pairs of example sentences became known, and research on translation using large collections of text (corpora) and statistics advanced.
The popular story:It is said that Makoto Nagao's 1984 paper started example-based machine translation The original source says:The idea was already written in the manuscript for the October 1981 conference presentation (it was published as a book in 1984). In the week after the conference where the Fifth Generation project announced its future of reasoning and knowledge in Tokyo (October 19–22), the same Japanese researcher was showing a different path, learning from a large number of examples.
What we still don’t know:The book said to have been published in 1984 (Artificial and Human Intelligence) has not been opened. How much the manuscript and the book differ in content has not been confirmed.
3 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Year: 1984 (the year of the book) is the one most often cited. The manuscript and the Machine Translation Archive listing, however, put it as a conference presentation in October 1981.
What the figure shows:The system finds the example sentence most similar to the sentence to translate and substitutes related words using a thesaurus. Without a similar example it cannot translate, so adding examples increases the range of sentences it can handle.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_example_mt.py
101982–1986 · Japan
Which Boom Is This?
In 1980s Japan, what was the AI craze called at the time?
In the National Diet Library's full-text search, a magazine from October 1982 already has the sentence (translated). The same magazine the next month called the boom of about 20 years earlier (translated). In 1985, a book has (translated), the Diet has (translated) (meaning that now is the second boom), and a magazine feature is titled (translated), so the way of counting was all over the place.
The trigger also differed from writer to writer: the Fifth Generation project, MYCIN's success, Feigenbaum's knowledge engineering, and tools for building AI were all named. Even in the middle of the boom there were cool voices saying (translated).
In July 1986, more than 700 people gathered and the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence was founded. Its prospectus noted that the United States has had the AAAI since 1980, but (translated). In the figure on the right, look at the names one at a time.
How we checked
Most of the magazine names were checked from the text that turned up in full-text searches of digitized books and magazines. We have not seen images of the pages, so the confidence grade is “weakly confirmed”. Remarks in the Diet were checked in the proceedings.
A 1991 white paper overseen by the government says the Japanese boom arose in a form (translated) from the Fifth Generation project and its reaction overseas.
Sources & confidence (6)Which Boom Is This?
October 1982–1985Weakly confirmedSources disagreeJapan
Magazines in October 1982 already use “artificial intelligence boom” and ── (translated). By 1985 there were cooler views too
In a full-text search of books and magazines digitized by the National Diet Library, I listed the unnumbered “artificial intelligence boom” from the oldest publication date, and the oldest were two magazines of October 1982 (within what was searched on September 23, 2026). (vol. 20, no. 10) has a sentence saying that the race to develop computers that understand natural language and think is intensifying, followed by “The artificial intelligence boom of a while back has come around again” (translated), and it also has the words (translated). (vol. 19, no. 10) has a sentence saying it will reveal the true nature of the recent artificial intelligence boom. The same issue also has a sentence saying that unless a way is made to overcome a fatal flaw, the on both sides of the Pacific may end as just another boom again (the oldest example of the form being used to mean AI). Of the 20 oldest hits, 15 are from 1985, and the writers of that year named different things as the trigger of the boom (the Fifth Generation plan, the success of the expert system MYCIN, Feigenbaum's proposal of knowledge engineering [1977], and “AI tools”, meaning software tools for building AI). In the same year, 1985, there were also words of a cooler view from the middle of the boom: (translated) (an article in question-and-answer form in the March issue of ), today's AI boom has hardly any substance behind it (July issue of ), and AI booms have repeated a history of disappointment, rising many times and fading (the special issue of , , November 1985).
The popular story:A 1991 government-supervised white paper says (translated) (record → Japan's AI boom was a reverse import (t…). This can be read as meaning that people in Japan began to speak of an around 1985 The original source says:In the full-text search, the term itself already appears in two magazines of October 1982. And it was written as the return of a boom of the past: “The artificial intelligence boom of a while back has come around again” (translated). However, 15 of the 20 oldest hits are from 1985, which agrees with the white paper's statement that it was widely embraced from around 1985 (the amount of digitized material differs by year, so be careful about simple comparisons of counts).
What we still don’t know:I have not seen the articles' titles, authors, or pages (the page images are limited to use inside the library and so were not opened). The excerpts come from OCR (optical character recognition) and are cut off at both ends. Materials that were not digitized or were misread cannot be searched, so it is not known whether there are examples older than October 1982. It is also unclear from the excerpt when in of October 1982 refers to (a month later the same magazine writes of (translated) (translated), record → A 1982 magazine already has the first a…).
11 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Trigger of the boom: “Jimu to Keiei” (Office and Management), April 1985, points to the Fifth Generation plan (“is thought to have originated from”). The “Preprints of Academic Lectures” (Society of Automotive Engineers of Japan, October 1985) points to the success of MYCIN (“one of the triggers”). “Automation,” May 1985, points to Feigenbaum's proposal of knowledge engineering (1977) (the excerpt is cut off at “and, that,” so other triggers may be listed as well). (November 1985) calls “AI tools” “one trigger.” The 1991 government-supervised white paper says the overseas response to the Fifth Generation was (translated) into Japan (another record). Momentum of the boom: “Jimu to Keiei,” April 1985, says it “has finally begun to show calm movement,” while “Eizo Joho” (Image Information), July 1985, writes of “a bit of an artificial intelligence boom lately.”
President 20(10) (1982 · Approximate frame numbers in the National Diet Library Digi… · Original source · Could not be opened)
A 1982 magazine already has the “first artificial intelligence boom” (translated) ── the oldest numbered expression found
An article in the magazine (November 1982 issue) has a sentence saying that companies that had become disillusioned with the results of the “first artificial intelligence boom” (translated), which arose some twenty years earlier, had kept their interest in this field lost. So in 1982 the boom of about twenty years before (by this site's calculation, the early 1960s) was already being called the (translated). In a full-text search of books and magazines digitized by the National Diet Library, this is the oldest example found of an AI boom expression with a number (within what was found).
The popular story:It is often thought that numbers like first boom and second boom were added afterward (in the 2010s) The original source says:A 1982 magazine already says “first artificial intelligence boom” (translated), so booms were being called by number from the middle of the second boom
What we still don’t know:I have not seen the article's title, author, or pages (library use only). Because it is OCR (text read by machine), it needs to be checked against the printed page.
1 sources and how they were checked
President 20(11) (1982 · Approximate frame number in the National Diet Library Digit… · Original source · Could not be opened)
4 April 1985Verified in the originalSources disagreeJapan
In the 1985 Diet, AI is explained as being said to be (translated)
Takemochi Ishii of the University of Tokyo was called to the Diet (a committee of the House of Representatives) and explained, (translated). He said the first was an effort centered on the United States from the mid to late 1960s, and the second was Japan's Fifth Generation Computer project. The idea of counting booms was already around in the middle of the second boom.
What we still don’t know:We do not know who started the phrase (translated) before 1985 (this is the oldest instance found within the Diet records).
2 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Ishii gives the period of the first boom as “the mid to late 1960s.” Many Japanese sources of the 2010s say “the late 1950s to the 1960s” (such as the 2016 White Paper of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; see another row)
In 1985, one feature called the boom of the time (the way of counting had not been settled)
The feature announcement in the magazine “Railway Telecommunications” (July 1985 issue) lists (translated) and (translated). Meanwhile, in the Diet at the same time it was called “now in its second boom” (translated) (April 1985), and in a book “second artificial intelligence boom” (translated) (March 1985). Some people counted the 1980s boom as the (translated) and others as the (translated).
The popular story:The second AI boom is often said to have been called the second boom from the start The original source says:In 1985, some features called the same boom “The Arrival of the First Artificial Intelligence Boom.” The way of counting was not settled from the beginning.
What we still don’t know:From the excerpt alone, we cannot tell which magazine and which issue ran the feature (it says June issue and July issue, and appears inside the introduction of an article on classifying telecommunications equipment).
1 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:This feature calls the 1980s boom (translated), while Mr. Kaminuma's (1985) calls it (translated), and Takemochi Ishii in the Diet (1985) calls it (translated).
24 July 1986Verified in the originalSources disagreeJapan
1986: the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence is founded, with over 700 people at the inaugural meeting. Its prospectus wrote that, as the AAAI was founded in the US in 1980 and grew large, (translated)
On July 24, 1986, the inaugural meeting of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence was held at the Memorial Hall of Gakushuin University, with over 700 people gathering. Akio Fukumura of Nagoya University was elected by unanimous vote as the first president of the society (a gathering where researchers present and discuss their research). The prospectus of March gave as reasons for founding that industry was highly interested because of the success of expert systems, which transfer experts' knowledge to computers, and that the United States had the AAAI (the American society for AI), founded in 1980, while Japan did not yet have one. According to Setsuo Ohsuga, who led the preparations, the trigger was the Ministry of Education's research-fund program for universities, which ended in March 1987, and to keep up the research momentum, preparations were rushed from January 1986. On the day of the meeting, the members were about 600 regular members, about 50 students and about 30 supporting-member companies, and 22 computer, electrical and telecommunications companies made donations.
7 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Number of participants: the brief report in the first issue says “about 700 people,” and the report in the second issue says “700-odd in total” (about the same). Name of the Ministry of Education research-fund program: Fukumura and Kitahashi call it “Specific Research” (Tokutei Kenkyu), while Ohsuga calls it “Special Research” (Tokubetsu Kenkyu).
Japan's AI boom was a “reverse import” (translated) — a 1991 white paper supervised by the government said the overseas reaction to the Fifth Generation project bounced back to Japan and became a boom
The , supervised by a division of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), wrote that an AI boom arose around the world, including the United States and Europe, starting from Japan's Fifth Generation project. In Japan, from around 1985 the term was embraced by the media, and new AI magazines and reports kept being launched. The white paper says that Japan's boom arose as a “reverse import” (translated) of the Fifth Generation and the reaction to it overseas. It adds that company heads, holding a myth-like belief that (translated), seemed to order development from the top down. At first, money was poured without hesitation into expensive AI-dedicated machines (such as those of Symbolics and Lisp Machines, Inc.) and tools.
The popular story:Many people think Japan's second AI boom was Japan's own, with Japan getting excited about its own Fifth Generation project The original source says:The 1991 white paper supervised by the government says that Japan's boom “arose as the overseas reaction was reverse-imported” (translated) from the Fifth Generation project (big talk overseas moved Japan's company heads)
What we still don’t know:This white paper does not check when the media first used the term “AI boom,” or in what year each magazine was launched (for example, ).
2 sources and how they were checked
AI White Paper 1991: AI Technology and Its Use (Supervised by the Electronics Policy Division, Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); edited by the ICOT-JIPDEC AI Center; published by the Japan Information Processing Development Association (JIPDEC) · 1991 · p.11 Part 2, The Present State and Outlook of AI, Chapter 1, sec… · Original source)
What the figure shows:During the 1980s AI boom itself, writers already called it the first boom, the second boom, or a return, with different ways of counting and different explanations of what started it.
111984 · Hopes and warnings
Two Rooms at the Same Conference
In the middle of the boom, did the people selling AI and the people researching it see the same future?
In August 1984, the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) held its conference at the University of Texas at Austin. In the exhibition hall, the brochure for TIMM, an AI tool that builds in experts' knowledge, boasted and said that expert systems do not get sick, quit, or take early retirement. To a reporter, the voices of the sellers sometimes sounded like .
In a discussion at the same conference, “The Dark Ages of AI”, the chair John McDermott laid out a . Within about five years, America's Strategic Computing program fails, Japan's Fifth Generation gets stuck, new companies go bankrupt, funding dries up, and everyone changes the name of their research. He said some people call this . In the figure on the right, move through the years and see which item happened when.
What you think you knowThe popular story:“The 1984 discussion predicted the AI winter exactly (a warning that came true)” is what people tend to say The original source says:the chair himself said . Much of the scenario did happen afterward, but not all at once five years later.
Who was to blame for the excess
“The excesses of the second boom were due to researchers' exaggerated promises” is what people tend to say. In the same reporter's article, most of the researchers had come to talk about small advances. The ones who acted as if were some of the companies that had put up exhibits.
The Strategic Computing Initiative
It was DARPA's plan document of October 1983, with about $600 million for the first five years. It is often said to be a response to Japan's Fifth Generation, but the plan document itself never mentions Japan or the Fifth Generation even once. A history book says that concern about Japan played a large role in getting the plan through Congress.
Sources & confidence (4)Two Rooms at the Same Conference
August 1984Verified in the original
1984: at an AI conference exhibit hall, an ad says — a record of the mood that this time it was the real thing
Science writer George Johnson described the exhibit hall at the August 1984 conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Most researchers had come to discuss small steps forward, but some exhibiting companies acted as if the age-old dream of making intelligent companions had already come true. The brochure for TIMM, an AI tool for entering experts' knowledge, boasted and said that expert systems never get sick and never resign or retire early. The reporter wrote that the sellers' words sometimes sounded like .
The popular story:The excesses of the second boom are often blamed on researchers' big promises The original source says:According to this article, most researchers had come to talk about small steps forward. It was only some of the exhibiting companies that acted as if (the article also says that IBM, Xerox, TI, DEC and others were modest).
What we still don’t know:The article does not name the company that sold TIMM.
The worst-case scenario of “The AI Winter” drawn in a 1984 discussion ── checking the answers afterward
At the conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), a panel discussion was held titled The moderator, Drew McDermott, said that behind the bustle in industry, there was deep unease among people who had researched for many years, from a worry that . As the worst-case scenario he drew this picture: in five years America's fails, Japan's Fifth Generation also hits a dead end, start-up companies go under, funding for AI stops, and everybody changes the names of their research to something else. He introduced the fact that some people call this state “The AI Winter.” But he also said he thought it unlikely. In the discussion, another researcher (Roger Schank), when asked whether he thought a catastrophe would come, said that he told them it would. On the other hand, the view was also put forward (the same person went on to say that the bubble might not burst but shrink a little).
The popular story:It is often said that the 1984 discussion predicted the AI winter exactly (a warning that came true) The original source says:The moderator drew it as a , and said himself, . Even within the discussion, views ranged from a catastrophe coming to its being not a winter but a dusk. Over the next few years, many parts of the scenario (the shrinking of the strategic computing initiative, the decline in companies, the decline in society membership, the end of the Fifth Generation's main stage) did happen, but not all at once five years later
What happened next:Afterward, development of the autonomous land vehicle (ALV), one of the plan's showpieces, was cut off in April 1988. The head of the responsible division, who took up the post in 1987, also cut off parts of the AI program. The plan disappeared from DARPA's budget in 1993. Membership in the American Association for Artificial Intelligence peaked at 16,421 in 1987 and settled at 4,000–5,000 by 1996. Many of the AI companies developing expert systems disappeared, were acquired, or changed their business. Japan's Fifth Generation Computer Project ended its main stage in fiscal 1992. Nilsson writes that these events piled up in the mid-to-late 1980s and came to be called “The AI Winter.”
What we still don’t know:Whether one of the scenarios, , really happened in the 1990s has not been confirmed in original sources (a candidate dealt with in u08)
3 sources and how they were checked
The Dark Ages of AI: A Panel Discussion at AAAI-84 (Drew McDermott, M. Mitchell Waldrop, B. Chandrasekaran, John McDermott, Roger Schank · 1985 · p.122 Drew McDermott's opening talk · Original source)
28 October 1983–1993Verified in the originalSources disagree
The US Department of Defense's DARPA announces the ── Japan's name never appears in the plan
DARPA, part of the US Department of Defense, released a large-scale plan to develop . It set three goals: autonomous systems such as vehicles that move by themselves, a pilot's associate (pilot support), and battle management (support for commanding operations). To get there, it would grow AI that has experts' knowledge written into it, research on images, speech, and language, and the computers to run them. The budget was about $600 million for the first 5 years and $50 million for fiscal 1984. The money DARPA put in over 1983–1993 was a little over $1 billion. It is often said to be “a counter to Japan's Fifth Generation,” but the plan itself never mentions Japan or the Fifth Generation.
The popular story:It is said that the United States began the Strategic Computing Initiative to counter Japan's Fifth Generation The original source says:The 1983 plan never mentions Japan or the Fifth Generation (it notes that its list of foreign programs is classified). According to history books, alarm about Japan played a large part in getting the plan approved in Congress. The “counter” was not a stated reason in the plan; it belongs to the mood of the time and to the work of persuading Congress.
What we still don’t know:How Japan was talked about in explanations to Congress (such as the 1983 hearings) has not been confirmed, because the hearing records could not be opened (this relies on Roland's work as cited by Nilsson).
3 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:The Japanese side (MITI Research Review 1995) counts it as one of the plans begun “inspired by the Fifth Generation.” The American plan itself, on the other hand, does not mention Japan and gives military need and “national security and economic strength” as its reasons. According to history books (Nilsson citing Roland), Japan's plan was one of the reasons and was especially effective in persuading Congress.
18 August 1980Verified in the originalSources disagree
The American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) is launched, with its first conference at Stanford University in August 1980
A society for artificial intelligence (AAAI, now called the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence) was founded in the United States and held its first national conference at Stanford University on August 18–21, 1980. Bruce Buchanan, one of the founding members, recalls that the founders gathered on their way to the international conference in Tokyo in the summer of 1979 and discussed the preparations. He also recalls that researchers themselves were divided over the term and that it sometimes drew pushback from outside, so they considered other names, but with no better name available it became AAAI. In the early 1980s, the boom in AI that wrote in experts' knowledge increased the number of people attending the conference.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Year the society was founded: the official AAAI page says “Founded in 1979,” while Nilsson 2010 says “founding in 1980.” In Buchanan's recollection, the preparatory discussions were in the summer of 1979 and the first conference was in 1980. The difference is probably which point counts as “founded” (the discussions, the registration, or the first conference), but the sources do not say which one they mean.
What the figure shows:At the same 1984 conference, the exhibition declared “We’ve built a better brain,” while a discussion room considered a “worst case scenario.” Many parts of that scenario later happened, but not all at once 5 years later.
121983–1984 · Common sense
Amniotic Fluid in a Male Patient
Can a machine notice that something is “wrong” when no rule says so?
A footnote in the MYCIN book (1984) tells this story. John McCarthy entered amniotic fluid as the culture site (the source of the specimen) for a male patient, and MYCIN did not notice the mistake and accepted it. This was because the common sense that everyone knows, that men have no amniotic fluid, was written nowhere in the rules.
In his 1984 piece , McCarthy pointed out that MYCIN has no view of what happens after a treatment, and cannot even answer . Nilsson (2010) uses the word brittle for the weakness of such systems.
In the figure on the right (a bicycle consultation), choose an impossible answer. Adding common-sense rules lets the system notice, but as the kinds of answers grow, the number of pairs to check for compatibility increases sharply.
number of pairs to check = n(n − 1) / 2
n
number of kinds of answers (facts). With n=100 there are 4,950 pairs, and with 1,000 there are 499,500
What you think you knowThe popular story:“There is a story that McCarthy teased MYCIN (a rumor)” is what has been passed down The original source says:MYCIN's own developers give as the source in a footnote of their 1984 book. But this story does not appear in McCarthy's own 1984 piece.
Sources & confidence (1)Amniotic Fluid in a Male Patient
1983–1984Verified in the originalSources disagree
When McCarthy gave MYCIN a male patient's amniotic fluid, it accepted it just like that ── recorded by the developers themselves in a book note
A well-known story is often told as an example of the weakness of AI that has experts' knowledge written into it: it does not know the (things taken for granted) that was not written in. A note in the MYCIN book (1984) says that John McCarthy entered that the culture site (the source of the test material) of a male patient was amniotic fluid, and that MYCIN accepted it without noticing the mistake. McCarthy's web paper (1984) does not have this story, but it describes the lack of common sense: MYCIN has no outlook on what happens after treatment, and cannot answer
The popular story:A story is told that McCarthy teased MYCIN (a rumor), and Nilsson also writes The original source says:The people who built MYCIN themselves wrote this episode in a note in their 1984 book, citing . However, McCarthy's web paper does not have the story and describes other lacks of common sense (such as no outlook on what happens after treatment).
What we still don’t know:I have not confirmed which text or lecture specifically refers to.
3 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Small differences in the story: Nilsson writes that the entry was a male who had had amniocentesis. The MYCIN book writes that the culture site of a male patient was amniotic fluid.
What the figure shows:A machine does not know common sense absent from its rules, such as men not having amniotic fluid, so it accepts impossible answers. Adding common-sense rules lets it notice, but the number of combinations to check grows rapidly.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_common_sense.py
131985 · Prediction
Common Sense, One Encyclopedia's Worth
How many years would it take to write in all of common sense?
In 1985, Douglas Lenat and his colleagues at MCC in Austin, Texas announced the CYC project. It is an attempt to overcome the of expert systems and the difficulty of acquiring knowledge with a large body of common sense. Over the next 10 years they would write the knowledge of a one-volume encyclopedia (about 30,000 entries) and the common sense underneath it. About 400 entries would be written carefully by themselves, and the rest copied and corrected by many typists. The effort was . They also wrote that if they had not got there in about 10 years, they would drastically rethink the project.
In 2023, Lenat and Gary Marcus called CYC , and wrote that its knowledge base is made of tens of millions of hand-written assertions, built over 40 years and 2,000 person-years. Move through the years in the figure on the right.
But the 150 person-years were for the people typing in the encyclopedia, and the 2,000 person-years for the whole knowledge base, so the scope of the count is not the same. How much common sense is enough is unknown in 1985, and unknown today.
person-years = number of people × number of years 2,000 person-years ÷ 40 years = 50 people on average
Person-year
the amount of work one person does in one year
Sources & confidence (1)Common Sense, One Encyclopedia's Worth
1985–2023Verified in the originalSources disagree
1985, the CYC project: an estimate of 10 years and about 150 person-years to enter an encyclopedia's worth of knowledge and common sense by hand. In 2023 the authors themselves wrote
Doug Lenat and colleagues at MCC (Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation, Austin, Texas) announced the CYC project in a 1985 article in AI Magazine. They set out to overcome two problems, that expert systems are (weak on unexpected problems) and the bottleneck of acquiring knowledge, by using a huge body of common-sense knowledge. The plan was to build, over the next 10 years, a large knowledge base of real-world facts and rules of thumb. They would carefully write up about 400 entries from a one-volume encyclopedia themselves, and enter the remaining 99% (about 30,000 entries) by having many data-entry staff copy and modify them. They estimated the effort of the entry staff at about 150 person-years. They also wrote that if the project did not look likely to get close to its goal by the deadline of about 10 years, the plan would have to be largely reworked.
What happened next:In a paper dated July 31, 2023, Doug Lenat and Gary Marcus call CYC (Cycorp's Cyc) . They write that the knowledge base consists of tens of millions of hand-written assertions, and that a sizable team of logicians and programmers spent 40 years and 2,000 person-years building the current knowledge base. It kept needing far more time and people than the original estimate of 10 years and 150 person-years. (The estimate of 150 person-years was for the encyclopedia data-entry staff, while 2,000 person-years is for the whole knowledge base, so the two do not count the same range of work.)
What we still don’t know:How much common sense must be written down to be enough was not known in 1985 and was still not known in 2023 (the 2023 paper discusses a way to combine CYC with today's text-generating AI).
1 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Date of publication: the AAAI page shows a posting date of 1985-03-15, and the issue is named Winter 1985
What the figure shows:The 1985 CYC plan aimed to write an encyclopedia's worth of common sense in 10 years and about 150 person-years. By 2023, it had taken 40 years and 2,000 person-years, though the 2 totals cover different scopes.
141982–1987 · Japan
Translation Software and an “Illusion”
How far could machine translation by rules be used in the 1980s?
In fiscal 1982, the national machine translation project Mu (of the Science and Technology Agency) began. It aimed to show that abstracts of scientific and technical papers could be translated between Japanese and English. It was led by Makoto Nagao and others at Kyoto University, and continued until 1986. They built grammars and dictionaries for three stages: analyze the sentence, convert its structure into the form of the other language, and generate the sentence.
Companies also released translation software (Fujitsu's ATLAS in 1984, Hitachi's HICATS/JE from May 1986, and others). In September 1987 at the machine translation summit in Hakone, Nagao said that . To users' expectation that he answered , and said that companies' exaggerated advertising was one cause. Mazda used it to translate maintenance manuals. At first only 40% of the translations were , but after adjusting it with Fujitsu, the accuracy reached about 80%, it reported.
In the figure on the right, try adding a dictionary of technical terms. Sentences from the manual become translatable, but the translation of ordinary sentences does not change.
What you think you knowThe popular story:“Machine translation came to be used in real work much later (translation by deep learning in the 2010s)” is what people tend to think The original source says:according to the record of the 1987 meeting, more than ten companies in Japan were selling translation software, and some companies, like Mazda, used it to translate manuals.
Sources & confidence (2)Translation Software and an “Illusion”
1982–1986Verified in the originalJapan
The Science and Technology Agency's machine translation project (the Mu Project): translating abstracts of scientific and technical papers between Japanese and English (1982–1986)
In fiscal 1982, using a special coordination fund of the Science and Technology Agency, a project began to show that abstracts of scientific and technical papers could be machine-translated between Japanese and English. It was first planned to take 3 years and cost about 700 million yen, but because of the government's budget situation it was extended to 4 years and continued until 1986. Kyoto University (Makoto Nagao and colleagues) took charge of the core of the translation system and the grammar. The Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL), JICST (Japan Information Center for Science and Technology), and one other national institution took charge of the dictionaries and of input and output. According to the paper, the main aim of the project was not to develop a practical product; it assumed that companies would use the results to make products. The paper calls it the , or Mu.
What we still don’t know:What products companies went on to make using these results cannot be told from this paper (it says only that ).
Machine translation software in 1980s Japan ── from Fujitsu's ATLAS in 1984 to more than 10 companies by 1987. Makoto Nagao called users' misunderstanding that an “illusion,” and said companies' exaggerated advertising was one cause
In 1984 Fujitsu put its machine translation systems ATLAS-I and ATLAS II on sale. Fujitsu's paper calls ATLAS-I, the English-to-Japanese translator, . Hitachi followed with HICATS/JE in May 1986, and Toshiba (TAURAS) and NEC (PIVOT, already announced) also presented their own systems. At the international conference , held in Hakone in September 1987, Makoto Nagao of Kyoto University said that . At the same time, Nagao pointed out that the sellers were being criticized by users for poor translation quality. Users, he said, greatly misunderstood that “any expressions will be translatable in good quality,” and companies' exaggerated advertising was also a cause. But he also said that there were many problems in the users' own original Japanese texts. Mazda adopted ATLAS II and translated automobile maintenance manuals. At first only 40% of the translations were , but after adjustments with Fujitsu it reported reaching an accuracy of about 80%.
The popular story:It is often thought that machine translation came into real work use only much later (with the deep-learning translation of the 2010s) (how it is said is this site's estimate) The original source says:The record of the 1987 conference shows that more than 10 companies in Japan were selling translation software. Some companies, like Mazda, used it to translate manuals (at first 40% → about 80% after adjustment). On the other hand, the opening talk called users' belief that “This is an illusion,” and said companies' exaggerated advertising was also a cause (expectations swelling too far also happened in the 1980s)
What we still don’t know:The expression “the world's first commercial … translation system” comes from Fujitsu's paper, and this site has not checked it against other sources. The prices and sales numbers of each company's products have not been confirmed either.
What the figure shows:Adding a subject dictionary let a rule-based translator handle that subject's texts, such as maintenance manuals, but ordinary sentences remained beyond it. The idea that it could translate any sentence was an illusion.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_transfer_mt.py
151985 · Japan
A Robot That Accompanies Your Singing
If a person starts singing a little higher, how does the accompaniment keep up?
Several research labs at Waseda University began preparing in 1980, and from 1981 built WABOT-2, a robot that plays musical instruments. Rather than a robot that does everything, they narrowed the goal to (translated), which takes both dexterity and intelligence. It talks with people in Japanese, reads a commercially printed score with a camera in about 15 seconds, and plays an electronic organ with the fingers of both hands and both feet. It has 50 degrees of freedom in total, and used 53 small computers for motion control alone.
To follow a singer, it makes note data on the spot from the singing voice and compares it with the stored score to find the gap. When the gap went over a set value (the threshold), it transposed the piece to match the voice in the next performance. Pitch is written in base 12, where the upper digit shows the octave and the lower digit the semitone. The control that ties everything together was written as if-then rules. In the figure on the right, move the singer's gap.
number of semitones = 12 × log₂(frequency of the singing ÷ frequency of the note in the score)
log₂
the power to which 2 is raised to get that number
Frequency doubled
1 octave (12 semitones)
What you think you knowThe popular story:“The one that played the electronic organ at the Tsukuba Expo was Waseda University's WABOT-2” is what people tend to say The original source says:in the developers' papers of 1985 and 1987, the performer at the Japanese Government Pavilion theme hall of the Science Expo was WASUBOT, built by Sumitomo Electric Industries on the basis of WABOT-2.
Sources & confidence (1)A Robot That Accompanies Your Singing
March 1985Verified in the originalSources disagreeJapan
At the 1985 science expo, a robot that reads sheet music and plays an electronic organ — Waseda University's WABOT-2 and the WASUBOT that Sumitomo Electric Industries built from it
A research group in the Faculty of Science and Engineering at Waseda University began preparing the instrument-playing robot WABOT-2 in 1980 and developed it in earnest from 1981. Unlike WABOT-1 (1973), a general-purpose robot, it narrowed its goal to (translated), which takes dexterity and intelligence. WABOT-2 talked with people in Japanese and read commercial sheet music in about 15 seconds with its camera eyes. It then played an electronic organ (an Electone) with the fingers of both hands and both feet, and listened for deviations in the pitch of a person's singing voice to match the key of the accompaniment. Its degrees of freedom (the number of directions in which joints and so on can move) total 50. The moving parts alone were run by 53 microprocessors (small computers) arranged in three levels (78 in the whole robot). At the Science Expo from March to September 1985, it was WASUBOT, built by Sumitomo Electric Industries based on WABOT-2, that played in the Japanese government's theme pavilion (according to the developers' 1985 paper and the abstract of their 1987 paper).
The popular story:It is often said that the robot that played the electronic organ at the Tsukuba Expo was Waseda University's WABOT-2 (Waseda University's 2026 article also says (translated)) The original source says:In the developers' own 1985 paper and in the abstract of their 1987 paper, the robot that played in the Japanese government's theme pavilion was “WASUBOT”, built by Sumitomo Electric Industries based on WABOT-2. Its mechanism is almost the same as WABOT-2's. The actual robot now on display at the Tsukuba Expo Center is also WASUBOT.
7 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Year of announcement: Waseda University's 2026 article says it was announced in 1984, while the developers' paper is listed as 1985 (received in May, August issue). Name of the robot that played at the expo: Waseda University's 2026 article says (translated), but in the developers' 1985 paper and the abstract of their 1987 paper, the robot that played in the Japanese government's theme pavilion is WASUBOT, built by Sumitomo Electric Industries based on WABOT-2. From the sources we opened, we cannot tell whether WABOT-2 itself was exhibited somewhere else at the expo
What the figure shows:WABOT-2 converted singing into note data and compared it with a stored score; when the difference exceeded a threshold, it transposed the music in its next performance to match the singing.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_transpose.py
161965 · Fuzzy sets
From How Many cm Is Someone “Tall”?
Where is the boundary of a “tall person”? How many cm?
In 1965, Lotfi Zadeh of the University of California, Berkeley, in his paper , described collections with no clear boundary, such as , by a number from 0 to 1 (the degree of membership) that says how much each element belongs. As an example of the , the paper gives values such as f(10) = 0.2 and f(100) = 0.95.
He also set rules for calculating. “Not A” is 1 − f, “A or B” is the larger, and “A and B” is the smaller. In the figure on the right, compare an ordinary set that jumps from 0 to 1 at 175 cm with a smooth fuzzy set. The paper also says that this is a completely different idea from statistics.
In 1980 he looked back and said that he had known from the start that the word fuzzy has a belittling ring.
Not A: 1 − fA A or B: max(fA, fB) A and B: min(fA, fB)
fA
degree of membership in set A (0–1)
max, min
the larger, the smaller
Sources & confidence (1)From How Many cm Is Someone “Tall”?
June 1965Verified in the original
Zadeh's — expressing collections with blurry edges, like , with numbers
Lotfi Zadeh of the University of California, Berkeley published the paper . A collection with no clear line between being in and out, such as or the , is not an ordinary mathematical set. But Zadeh wrote that such collections play an important role in human thinking, particularly in recognizing patterns and communicating information. He then devised , which express how much an object belongs to the collection as a number from 0 to 1 (the degree of membership). Looking back in 1980, he said the idea came to him in New York in July 1964. He said he knew from the start that the word has a belittling ring and is unscientific, which would cause problems, but no other word fit. In the late 1980s in Japan the idea spread as in automatic subway operation and home appliances (a separate record).
What we still don’t know:In 1980 Zadeh himself wrote that criticisms include that it is and . Who decides the degree of membership, and how, becomes a matter of agreement in each application.
What the figure shows:Chapter 4 represented tallness as a degree from 0 to 1, with an ordinary set jumping from 0 to 1 at 175 cm and a fuzzy set rising smoothly; Zadeh's paper extended this to numbers much greater than 1, such as f(10) = 0.2 and f(100) = 0.95, and calculated with vague terms using NOT = 1 − f, OR = the larger value, and AND = the smaller value. This gives results impossible for ordinary sets or probabilities, such as much greater AND not much greater having a nonzero value, showing that degree of membership is different from probability.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_membership.py
171987 · Japan
Stopping a Subway with Fuzzy Logic
How does a skilled driver stop exactly on the mark without jolting the train?
On July 15, 1987, the Sendai City subway opened. The automatic train operation device developed by Hitachi used (translated). According to the company's 1988 article, it combined three things: AI (knowledge engineering) rules written in (translated) (the if-then form); a simulation that stands in for the skill of an expert driver; and fuzzy theory, which expresses several criteria as satisfaction degrees from 0 to 1 and combines them. Ride comfort, stopping accuracy and energy saving improved, and the article calls it (translated) (the words of the company that built it).
The figure on the right is a simple example of the same way of thinking, not Sendai's actual device. Compare three methods by their stopping-position error and the change in braking (the jolt): using just one rule, mixing several rules, and predicting ahead and choosing the brake with the highest satisfaction.
satisfaction = min(satisfaction with the stopping position, satisfaction with ride comfort) → choose the brake with the highest value
Satisfaction with the stopping position
predicted ahead, 1 when the train stops close to the target
Satisfaction with ride comfort
1 when the change in braking is small (the setting in this figure)
What you think you knowThe popular story:“Fuzzy is a buzzword for home appliances” is what people tend to think The original source says:before appliances, it was used in the automatic operation of the Sendai City subway that opened in 1987.
Sources & confidence (1)Stopping a Subway with Fuzzy Logic
15 July 1987Verified in the originalJapan
Sendai's subway opens, using (translated) (AI with rules that handle vagueness) for automatic train operation
The Sendai city subway (the ninth city subway in Japan) opened on July 15, 1987. The automatic train operation system developed by Hitachi adopted (translated). It used AI (knowledge engineering) rules written in (translated) (the form 'if so-and-so, then do so-and-so') to replace the skills of expert drivers. The article says that better ride comfort, better stopping accuracy and energy saving were achieved, and introduces this predictive fuzzy control as (translated) (the words of the article by the company that made it).
The popular story:Fuzzy is often thought to be a buzzword of home appliances The original source says:Before home appliances, it was used in the automatic operation of the Sendai city subway that opened in 1987. The company that developed it explains it as AI (knowledge engineering) rules in “IF-THEN form” (translated) (written as one of the second-boom AIs that build in knowledge).
What we still don’t know: (translated) is the words of an article by the company that made it, and has not been confirmed in other sources.
What the figure shows:Using only 1 rule makes braking jerky, while blending rules makes it smooth. Predicting ahead and choosing the braking action with the highest satisfaction brings an accurate stop with little jolting.
Brake strength over time
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_fuzzy_brake.py
181980–1990 · Checking a prediction
The “Standard Tool” Became a Washer
Where did the forecast for fuzzy logic get its answer?
In September 1980, Zadeh wrote that fuzzy set theory was starting to be used everywhere from industrial process control to medical diagnosis, and was . He gave no deadline year.
Seven years later, in 1987, the Sendai City subway adopted it, and in 1989, 48 companies founded the Laboratory for International Fuzzy Engineering Research (LIFE). On February 1, 1990, Matsushita Electric released a washing machine, “Aisaigo Day Fuzzy”. From the time it takes for the cloudiness of the water to settle and the transmittance once it has settled, it decides the washing time with 6 rules, such as (translated). That year, the gold prize in the new-word category of the year's buzzword awards went to . In the figure on the right, change the amount and kind of dirt.
washing time = Σ(fit × time of the rule) ÷ Σ fit
Fit
min(degree of T, degree of V)
T
time until the cloudiness settles
V
transmittance once it has settled
Inside the washing machine
According to an article by its makers in 1990, light is shone near the drain valve and the strength of the light passing through the wash water (the transmittance) is measured. When washing starts, the dirt dissolves and the transmittance drops, and then it settles. Muddy dirt settles early and oily dirt settles late, and the more dirt there is, the lower the level at which it settles.
The rules and numbers were adjusted using data collected in homes and the know-how of the makers. The shapes of the rules and the times (in minutes) in the figure are an example made up for this site.
Sources & confidence (3)The “Standard Tool” Became a Washer
25 September 1980Verified in the originalJapan
1980: Zadeh says fuzzy sets are ── 7 to 10 years later they reach Japan's subways and home appliances
Lotfi Zadeh, who proposed fuzzy sets (the idea of describing a collection with blurry edges by degrees from 0 to 1; his 1965 paper), wrote a short piece looking back on that paper for the column in the magazine Current Contents, dated September 25, 1980 (the column's note says the paper had been cited more than 305 times since 1965). At the end, Zadeh wrote that fuzzy set theory was beginning to be used widely, from industrial process control to medical diagnosis and information analysis, and was already a thriving field of research in mathematics. He wrote that it was for dealing with systems that are too complex to analyze by ordinary methods or too vaguely defined. He did not give a deadline year.
What happened next:The Sendai City Subway, which opened on July 15, 1987, 7 years later, used (translated) in Hitachi's automatic train operation system. A 1988 article by the company that built it called this the first in the world. In 1989, with national backing, 48 companies gathered to form the Laboratory for International Fuzzy Engineering Research (LIFE), a technology research association, which carried out research until 1995. On February 1, 1990, Matsushita Electric put on sale a fully automatic washing machine that uses fuzzy logic, and the gold prize in the new-word category of that year's New Words and Buzzwords Awards went to “Fuzzy.” The organizers' explanation says it was a word made famous by the fuzzy engineering that Professor Zadeh developed, and that the first home appliance with it was Matsushita Electric's washing machine. That set off a boom, and a large fuzzy market formed with makers jostling in. So the forecast, at least in Japan, took the form of use from subway control to home appliances within about 10 years. How far it became a standard tool worldwide or in other fields has not been confirmed on this site.
What we still don’t know:This site has not checked how far the forecast that fuzzy sets would become a standard tool in the not distant future came true worldwide or in fields such as medicine and information analysis (what it confirmed goes as far as Japan's subway, a national research association, and home appliances). It also has not confirmed how much fuzzy control kept being used in Japan after the boom of 1990. It is also not known how the three criticisms Zadeh listed (especially how to decide degrees of membership) were answered afterward.
1990: a washing machine with fuzzy control goes on sale, and wins the gold prize in the new-word category of the New Words and Buzzwords Awards
On February 1, 1990, Matsushita Electric released the fully automatic washing machine “Aisaigo Day Fuzzy”. It uses an optical sensor to detect how cloudy the wash water is, and decides the washing time with six rules such as (translated) (the saturation time is the time until the cloudiness settles, and the transmittance is how easily light passes through). These rules were created from data collected in homes and from engineers' know-how. In the same year's , was chosen for the gold prize in the new-word category. The organizer explains that this washing machine was the first to apply fuzzy theory to a home appliance and the spark of the boom, creating a large fuzzy market with many companies jostling in.
The popular story:The fuzzy boom is often thought to have begun with home appliance advertising The original source says:Before home appliances there was the automatic operation of the Sendai city subway in 1987 (→ Sendai's subway opens, using predictive…) and the government-backed research association LIFE in 1989 (→ Laboratory for International Fuzzy Engi…). The (translated) among home appliances was the 1990 washing machine (the organizer's explanation)
What we still don’t know:We have not checked how well fuzzy appliances sold afterward (sales numbers and so on)
1989–1995Verified in the originalSources disagreeJapan
Laboratory for International Fuzzy Engineering Research (LIFE): 48 companies gather and, with government backing, study technology for handling (translated) for six years (1989–1995)
To apply fuzzy theory, which processes information that contains (translated), to engineering, the technology research association “Laboratory for International Fuzzy Engineering Research (LIFE)” was founded in 1989. Not only computer companies but 48 companies (49 at the end of fiscal 1989), in fields such as automobiles, steel and securities, took part. The research period was about six years, and the research and development cost was expected to be about 5 billion yen (as of the 1991 white paper). The laboratory had three research rooms, studying fuzzy control, fuzzy intelligent information processing and fuzzy computers. According to a 2005 look back, a total of 66 researchers were on staff at the laboratory near Osanbashi pier in Yokohama, and it was active until 1995. Toshiro Terano served as director for all six years.
What we still don’t know:We have not checked the total cost actually spent (the 1991 white paper only writes (translated))
2 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Number of participating companies: 48 (the white paper's main text and the 2005 look back) and 49 (the white paper's “as of the end of fiscal Heisei 1 (1989)”). The difference comes from the date of counting.
What the figure shows:Fuzzy logic entered washing machines 10 years after Zadeh wrote that it was “likely to become —in the not distant future —a standard tool.” The machines blended 6 rules to choose washing time from light transmission and the time it took for cloudiness to settle.
Change of transmittance over time (the curves and rules are an example made up for this site)
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_fuzzy_washer.py
191980–1989 · Upkeep
The Rules Kept Growing
Once you build an AI with rules in it, are you done?
The rules of R1 (XCON) kept growing from 772 in June 1980. When DEC took over the upkeep there were about 1,000, around July 1982 about 2,000, and in 1984 2,500, and in 1989 the related systems together had 17,500. This was because each time DEC released a new product, the assembly work itself changed.
According to an article written by DEC people in 1984, continuing to add knowledge took about four people's work every year, and, as they said of upkeep, , and it needs specially trained people. In that same year, 1984, the brochure in the exhibition hall boasted that expert systems never quit or retire.
New rules need to be checked for contradiction with the rules that came before. In the figure on the right, press a dot to see the number of rules at that time and the number of pairs.
number of pairs = n(n − 1) / 2
n
number of rules. With 772 there are 297,606 pairs, and with 17,500 about 153 million pairs
What you think you knowThe popular story:“XCON was a great success that saved $40 million every year” is what people tend to say The original source says:that figure is an estimate in a 1989 paper by a DEC person, , and this site has confirmed it only through Nilsson's citation. The 1984 article by DEC people gives no dollar amount, and describes the effort of upkeep.
Sources & confidence (1)The Rules Kept Growing
January 1980–1989Verified in the originalSources disagree
R1 (XCON): an AI of “IF–THEN rules” that decides the combination of parts for computer orders, used every day at DEC's factory
John McDermott of Carnegie Mellon University developed R1 (called XCON inside the company), an AI of “IF–THEN rules” that takes orders for the computer company DEC's VAX computers and checks for shortages and combinations of the parts needed (about 90 parts per machine). Development began in December 1978; in October–November 1979 six experts checked it on 50 orders; and from January 1980 it was used routinely at DEC's factory. The number of rules grew from 772 in June 1980 to 2,500 in 1984, and adding knowledge needed about 4 people's worth of work every year. A DEC staff member wrote that maintenance work after development was where , and that specially trained people are essential.
The popular story:XCON is often called a great success that saved $40 million a year The original source says:That amount is an figure from a 1989 paper by DEC staff, and this site has confirmed it only through Nilsson's citation (the original paper could not be opened). An article written by DEC staff in 1984 gives no dollar figure; it says that continuing to add knowledge takes about 4 people's worth of effort every year, and that maintenance work “It probably represents the largest cost.” The number of rules grew from 750 to 2,500 (1984), and to 17,500 (1989) counting related systems.
What we still don’t know:How the estimate of was calculated (what was counted as a benefit) is not known, because the original paper could not be opened.
4 sources and how they were checked
Where sources disagree:Number of rules: 772 in June 1980 (McDermott 1980), about 750 at hand-over in 1980 (Polit), 750 in October 1979 (Bachant & McDermott). The differences come from the time point and the way of counting.
What the figure shows:XCON's rules grew from 772 to 17,500, requiring roughly 4 people's worth of maintenance work each year. As rules increase, the number of pairs to check for contradictions becomes very large.
201977– · Acquiring knowledge
Widening the Narrow Pipe
How do you move the knowledge in an expert's head into a computer?
In 1977, in the invited paper , Feigenbaum wrote that . A bottleneck is the narrowest passage, like the neck of a bottle. There was also a case where drawing out the knowledge took little effort: PUFF, a program for diagnosing lung tests, got 55 rules from under 50 hours of exchanges with experts, under 10 person-weeks of work.
The same paper introduced, as one way to widen the pipe, META-DENDRAL, a program that automatically finds rules from measurement data on molecules whose structures are known. The rules it found were said to be on a par with the experts' rules in quality. The figure on the right shows the simplest method: finding rules one at a time from examples that come with answers.
Rules written by people kept needing upkeep. The road of learning from data grows in Chapters 8 and 9.
What you think you knowThe popular story:“Second-boom AI could only have experts' knowledge written in by hand, and learning from data begins with the third boom” is how people tend to divide it The original source says:the 1977 paper that wrote about the bottleneck itself introduced, as one answer to it, META-DENDRAL, which finds rules automatically from data.
Sources & confidence (1)Widening the Narrow Pipe
22 August 1977Verified in the original
1977: Feigenbaum's invited paper ── , and
In his invited paper at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-77), held at MIT in the United States in August 1977, Edward Feigenbaum of Stanford University called the work of transferring experts' knowledge into computers and explained its art through examples from his own research. He argued that the power of intelligent behavior comes from experts' knowledge rather than from general reasoning methods, and summed it up as “in the knowledge is the power.” He also gave a second reason why META-DENDRAL, a program that discovers rules automatically, came to exist: in building intelligent application programs, he had realized that (a bottleneck is the narrowest part of a path, the hard spot). META-DENDRAL finds rules from measurement data of molecules whose structures are known, and he said it produced rules at a level comparable to those made by experts.
The popular story:It is often said that second-boom AI could only be filled with experts' knowledge written in by hand, and that learning from data began with the third boom (this site's split between the second and third booms follows that form too) The original source says:The 1977 paper that wrote itself introduces, as one solution, META-DENDRAL, a program that finds rules automatically from measurement data (it says a paper on the rules it found was published in a major chemistry journal). The first example in the same paper was PUFF, a diagnosis program for lung-function tests (55 rules), which could be built with fewer than 50 hours of interaction with an expert and under 10 person-weeks of effort, a story of small effort.
What we still don’t know:The paper is described as , and it announces that the second will discuss the general troubles of knowledge engineering (how to find experts, the shortage of people, research funding, and so on). This site has not confirmed whether the second paper was published.
What the figure shows:Getting knowledge out of experts was a bottleneck, a narrow passage slowing progress. One way to widen it was to find rules automatically from examples with known answers, a method already introduced in a 1977 paper.
This is the same mechanism as "Try it", written as Python code. Press ▶ Run and the result appears below. Change the numbers and run it again.
u06_rule_induction.py
Closing
What This Chapter Still Doesn't Know
AI that had experts' knowledge written in as rules spread to chemistry, medicine, minerals, factories, translation, subways, and washing machines. But there are numbers and stories we have not yet been able to confirm. For XCON's estimate of , we do not know what was counted as profit. We also do not know who first said, and when, that MYCIN was not used because of legal and liability problems.
Whether the part of the 1984 discussion's scenario where everyone changes the name of their research really happened, this site has not yet confirmed. Nor have we measured how far Zadeh's forecast came true as a standard tool, in the world's fields beyond Japan's subway and home appliances. And how much common sense is enough is unknown in 1985, and unknown today.
In the next chapter, we look at the big project that Japan's government started around the same time, the Fifth Generation Computer. It was a plan to make reasoning and writing in knowledge faster with a special-purpose computer.